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Ology Schmology 
A Post-structuralist Approach 
 
 
 
Engagement with ontological and epistemological issues in political study has been 
arguably less than full-blooded. Too often it seems that they are treated as unpleasant 
hurdles to be quickly vaulted in order to get on with the ‘business’ of political analysis. 
Bates and Jenkins’ article (2007) is all the more welcome therefore in cutting against this 
trend in its compelling attempt to open up a space for critical reflection. The authors 
rightly allude to the danger of foreclosure both in terms of the way politics is taught and 
understood.1 This danger would appear to be especially apparent in respect of post-
structuralist thought and the sometimes rather ungentle treatment it receives in the 
discipline. Notwithstanding the diversity and tensions within post-structuralism, what 
follows represents an attempt to synthesise what I take to be key elements in this 
emerging tradition and the type of contribution it can make. 
 
Bates and Jenkins’ comment that there is sometimes a tendency in post-structuralism to 
‘consciously conflate ontology and epistemology’ (2007: 60) requires some qualification. 
It is certainly true that there is not the same degree of conceptual separation that one can 
find in other traditions. Attention is drawn to the instability of any such division: 
knowledge is always situated in terms of fundamental beliefs about existence and, in turn, 
these beliefs are affected by what is considered as authentic knowledge – there is a basic 
reflexivity which cannot be neatly parcelled up. The central epistemological question is 
not what comprises the foundation of knowledge, in the classical sense, but rather how 
are the sources of knowledge constituted and made use of in concrete historical terms?  
But if there is no absolute separation it is equally true to say that there is no absolute 
conflation either. Stress is placed instead on an essential undecidability. A theological 
ontology, for example, can be developed in many different directions and with different 
results for conceptions of knowledge and methodology (e.g. Berkeley’s practical 
approach to knowledge as compared with Malebranche’s more mystical perspective vis-
à-vis the ontology of the Divine Mind).  
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Regarding Hay’s assertion that ontology is ‘logically prior’ to epistemology (2007: 117), 
I would suggest that there is more ambiguity than may appear at first sight. Marxism and 
the concept of class provide a case in point. By the end of the nineteenth century it was 
becoming clear that workers were not evolving en masse into revolutionary communists 
but were exhibiting a far greater predisposition towards social democracy and trade 
unionism. This knowledge provoked an early crisis for Marxism and, in some quarters at 
least, a major re-assessment of ontological assumptions.2 Hay’s assertion that 
epistemological claims are never ontologically neutral is well taken, but this is also true 
of the converse. So it is not so much a question of whether ontology is prior to 
epistemology, or vice versa, as one of trying to see how the ontological and the 
epistemological are articulated as parts of a characteristic relational whole or paradigm. 
 
Bates and Jenkins correctly identify terminological confusions in the introductory 
material of Marsh and Furlong (2002). This seems to be especially true of the latter’s 
view of realism. The authors claim that interpretivism is a position that ‘reject(s) the 
notion that the world exists independently of our knowledge’ (2002: 26). I am not aware 
of any thinker in this tradition who argues this. Both interpretivism and post-structuralism 
take for granted the idea of an external world. As Richard Rorty, an interpretivist thinker, 
puts it: while the world is certainly ‘out there’, the truth about the world is not (Rorty, 
1989: 5). In other words, while the world exists independently it cannot be accessed in an 
unmediated way or in terms of a neutral meta-language. This is precisely why it has to be 
interpreted. And, of course, nothing can be interpreted beyond interpretation as such; we 
cannot break out of all history and see the world as it ‘actually is’. So the issue of realism 
is somewhat inconsequential in this regard; many perspectives start from a realist 
position.3 What is of consequence is what is done with the idea of an external world.  
 
There are two main types of response. The first assumes that the world has an intrinsic 
nature that can be realized in positive terms as thought. This is paradigmatic of the 
idealist tradition and is reflected in all those discourses which posit some form of 
definitive conceptual closure. The second, however, rejects any such intrinsicality and 
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affirms instead the materialist principles of indeterminacy and non-closure. These 
responses are antithetical to each other and attempts to combine them positively (of 
which there have been many) inevitably result in inconsistency. Indeed Roy Bhaskar’s 
‘transcendental realism’, which in recent years has become quite dominant in political 
study, cannot but appear ambiguous from this point of view. While Bhaskar affirms that 
current knowledge is always fallible, and while there may be all kinds of discursive 
variations and contestation, there remains something fixed and eternal to which the latter 
can be held accountable: an extra-discursive plane of intransitivity. For Bhaskar 
‘philosophy can tell us what the world would be like even if we didn’t have discursive 
practices’ (Bhaskar in Laclau & Bhaskar, 1998: 13). Here the extra-discursive functions 
as a kind of regulative ideal or supreme index that serves to validate (or invalidate) the 
trajectory and accumulation of human knowledge and endeavour. In Bhaskar’s terms 
there is a basic ‘order of the world’ that is ‘ontologically’ inscribed and which serves to 
measure the degree of ‘epistemic fallacy’ in any undertaking – i.e. the extent to which 
knowledge about the world is confused with the way the world really is. Yet it is this 
very notion of ‘the way the world really is’ – and the idea of a direct (or even indirect) 
access to it – that is the hallmark of all idealism. 
 
Post-structuralism, by contrast, tends in a materialist direction insofar as it affirms an 
essential gap between the external world and the way we interpret that world.4 No 
discourse is capable of eliminating the gap or of establishing absolute closure; otherwise 
there would be a complete identity between discourse and object. This means that there 
are no independent positivities, only historical and incomplete attempts to positivise the 
meaning/identity of objects in the face of that which necessarily has to be excluded as 
negativity. Yet in being excluded, this negativity also plays a constitutive role. Put 
crudely, X can only be given in relation to not-X (‘light’ depends on ‘dark’, ‘us’ depends 
on ‘them’ and so on). The more a positivisation tries to complete itself, the more it 
underscores the unmasterable and constitutive dimension of negativity. Consequently 
there is a decisive movement away from the object-as-such to a consideration of the 
context. The consistency of ‘womanhood’ and the feminine/not-feminine distinction, for 
example, is achieved in very different ways under the terms of traditionalist and feminist 
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discourse. The latter, moreover, is not any more ‘authentic’ than the former (it comes no 
closer to ‘woman-as-such’). Feminist discourse is likewise open to further challenge and 
subversion from Other (i.e. hitherto excluded) traditions – libertarianism, ecologism, 
post-feminist discourse and so on – without final resolution.  
 
So how does post-structuralism deal with the ‘ologies’? Does the epistemology/ontology 
distinction simply collapse or is it, as Furlong and Marsh suggest (2007: 206), rendered 
meaningless? What occurs in post-structuralism is not a rejection but a reformulation of 
the distinction. The ontological and the epistemological cannot be simply elided, but 
neither do they confront each other as discrete independent realms. There is no ontology 
‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; it cannot be reached or represented in any positive or 
palpable sense. From a post-structuralist perspective, the ontological is essentially that 
which shows the limits of every epistemological system. Possessing no content of its 
own, ontology functions as the ‘moment’ of failure/lack in all representational knowledge 
and which thereby reveals the nature of the latter as a historical-contingent enterprise. 
Feminist subversion of the gender system of meaning/knowledge, for example, is made 
possible precisely as the result of an inherent ontological negativity that prevents closure. 
And this extends to all social reality: insofar as every concrete order is marked by 
lack/negativity, then subversion and reconfiguration remain an ontological possibility.  
 
Post-structuralism affirms an irreconcilable dependency: epistemology is constituted as a 
finite order against a background of ontological (and transcendental) negativity; the 
ontological emerges as the result of a basic negativity (the disruptions, contestations, 
antagonisms and so on) in every order. You cannot have one without the other.5 It is on 
this basis that post-structuralism has tended to move away from the idea of politics 
(conceived as a specific arena) and towards a broader notion of the political: i.e. the 
processes and practices through which every attempt to ground meaning and knowledge 
in positive terms are immanently undermined and shown to be contingent. This does not 
mean that everything is political, which would be the same as saying that nothing is 
political. Rather it means that because there is always a gap – a constitutive asymmetry 
between finiteness and insuperable negativity - then there is no part of our social world 
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that in principle is beyond politicisation or, for that matter, de-politicisation. As Hegel 
knew well, the human being is the very antithesis of all nature and consequently our 
reality is always virtual; something that has to be produced and mediated historically and 
which ipso facto is prone essentially to political resistance and transformation. 
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Notes 
1.  A degree of foreclosure is, of course, always necessary in order to establish the 
coherence of a perspective. However, I would argue that Marsh & Furlong’s attempt to 
occupy a kind of commonsense-middle-ground by presenting perspectives such as post-
structuralism as ‘extreme’ is one that does indeed reflect an insidious form of 
gatekeeping (Marsh & Furlong, 2002; Furlong & Marsh, 2007). 
 
2. As is well known, Gramsci marks a radical break in his affirmation that class 
orientation - revolutionary communist, social democratic or, indeed, fascist - cannot be 
determined in advance but depends on context and political engagement: there is a clear 
move away from ontological necessity towards an emphasis on contingency.  
 
3. Marsh and Furlong add to the confusion when they argue that a foundationalist is 
someone who believes in a world ‘out there’ while an anti-foundationalist is someone 
who rejects this view (Furlong & Marsh, 2007: 205). This is incorrect. If we take a 
philosopher like Berkeley – who rejects any notion of an external world – then we can 
see that his thought remains fully within the field of foundationalism. Why? Because for 
him all reality is thoroughly grounded in the pure archetypes of God’s mind. And while 
post-structuralism and interpretivism are certainly anti-foundationalist (there is no 
ultimate determination), they nonetheless presuppose the independence of the world. 
 
4.  Materialism in this sense has nothing to do with the (realist) idea of an independent 
material world. I am using the term materialism in the classical philosophical sense as 
derived from the notion of matter: i.e. the leftover or that which escapes knowable 
(essential) form. Matter is therefore emblematic of non-closure, of an opening onto 
something Other that is always beyond idealist attempts to reduce what exists to 
conceptual form (see introduction to Staten, 1985 for a discussion of this).  
 
5.  As Zupančič argues, the space of the infinite is opened as a result of the failure of 
finitude (Zupančič, 2006: 195-196) 
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